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THE REALIST AND SECURED CREDIT:
GRANT GILMORE, COMMON-LAW COURTS, AND
THE ARTICLE 9 REFORM PROCESS
William J. Woodward, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION

One of the central, defining features of secured debt is its priority. Yet, the policy support for first priority for secured creditors is, at
best, unclear and, at worst, shaky.' What is, perhaps, more remarkable is that the central policy question-whether secured creditors
ought to enjoy the broad first priority in debtors' assets-has escaped
thorough consideration both in the original process that led to the
development of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and, more
recently, in the process now underway to reform it.
Professor Elizabeth Warren invited such discussions in April 1996
by submitting to the American Law Institute a "Carve-out Proposal" to
be included within a new Article 9.2 This Proposal, in essence, provided that secured lenders could obtain only 80% of the value of personal property collateral against which they loaned; the first 20% of
the value of the collateral was "carved out" for unsecured creditors.
The Proposal was an amendment to the provision in Article 9 addressing priority conflicts between perfected, secured parties and lien creditors. 3 If implemented, a levying creditor could obtain 20% of the

value of Article 9 collateral through levy and execution under state
law. Accordingly, in bankruptcy, a trustee using her "strong arm"
power 4 could "carve out" 20% of the value of all of a debtor's encumbered personal property for the benefit of the estate.
The Warren Proposal was an attempt to confront directly the distributional issues implicit in secured creditors' priority and thus, the
t Professor of Law, Temple University. Thanks to Amy Boss, Jean Braucher, Dick
Cappalli, Nathalie Martin, David Skeel, Elizabeth Warren, and Candace Zierdt for comments on earlier drafts of this Article and to Kalimah White for her research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Pirty of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857 (1996) (generally discussing efficiency and
incentives for priority); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv.
1887, 1947-63 (1994) (discussing "three theories and one not so bad" in support of subordination). For a more comprehensive listing of recent work, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra,
at 862 n.23.
2 Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School, to Council of the American Law Institute (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author).
3 U.C.C. § 9-301 (1995).
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
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Proposal invited those currently making secured credit policy to focus
directly on the basic policy question at the center of their enterprise.
However, despite the central nature of priority in the institution of
secured credit, the Warren Proposal received a hostile reception
within the Article 9 reform process. There was, perhaps predictably, a
flurry of letters and short articles decrying either the details of the
Proposal or what it would do to deserving borrowers. 5 Subsequently,
the Article 9 Drafting Committee unanimously rejected it, apparently,
without any voice in its support.6 The low esteem in which the reform
process held the Warren Proposal is strikingly similar to the regard
reformers (both in the original Article 9 process and now) have given
to those judicial decisions which, like the Warren Proposal, would
tend to limit secured credit.
In 1981, a year before his death, Grant Gilmore confessed that
those involved in the original, creative process that led to Article 9 did
not pay adequate attention to the messages the common-law courts
had been sending them.7 Gilmore's observations about the original
development of Article 9 seem to apply to the revision process as well.
The tendency of the Article 9 development process (then and now) to
reject common-law decisions, together with the current reformers'
one-sided consideration of the Warren Proposal and the core issue it
raised, 8 suggest that the revision process may be flawed or, at least,
5 See Letter from Brian Hulse, Esq. to Steven 0. Weise, Esq. (June 6, 1996) (on file
with author); Letter from Howard Ruda, Esq. to Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr. (May 22, 1996) (on

file with author); Letter from James J. White, Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, to Edwin E. Smith, Esq. (June 3, 1996) (on file with author).
For short articles that criticize the proposal, see, for example, Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H.
Kurth, ProfessorElizabeth Warren's Article 9 Carve-Out Proposal: A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC

L.J. 3 (1997); Hugh Ray, Bankruptcy Law, TEx. LAw.,June 10, 1996, at 26-28; Memorandum
from Jeffrey S. Turner to the Article 9 Drafting Committee (June 1, 1996), reprinted as The
Broad Scope of Revised Article 9 IsJustified, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328 (1996).

Professor James J. White, for example, challenged the Proposal's sequential levy feature-the possibility that ajunior secured creditor would defeat a senior secured creditor
by getting a judgment and levying rather than foreclosing under Article 9-and argued
that the senior secured creditor might not be able to put the debtor into involuntary bankruptcy, that the Proposal would malfunction under the preference section of the Bankruptcy Code, that trustees might claim more than 20% under their "strong arm" power,
and that the LIRS. might get excessive priority over the senior secured creditor. Letter
from James J. White to Edwin E. Smith, supra.
6 A description of the Drafting Committee meeting that resulted in the rejection of
the Warren Proposal can be found in Alvin C. Harrell, Article 9 Drafting Committee Considers
Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 189, 193-94 (1996).
7 Grant Gilmore, The GoodFaithPurchaseIdea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 625 (1981).

8 Many of those who reacted to the Proposal would, no doubt, characterize their
reactions as anything but "one-sided," and my characterization is not meant to disparage
those efforts to offer expertise on the question raised by the Proposal. Curiously, however,
despite considerable prompting, the Drafting Committee appeared simply unwilling even
to consider the question whether secured credit ought to be limited in the interests of
unsecured creditors. It made no effort to draft a proposal of any kind on its own. When

1997]

THE REALIST AND SECURED CREDIT

1513

severely limited in what it can consider and evaluate. The Warren
Proposal-or, rather, the unabashedly negative reaction to it-thus
provides an occasion to examine the "private legislature" that develops and revises the UCC. 9
This effort will consider the UCC revision process in a larger context that includes the superficially similar process by which Restatements of Law are created by the American Law Institute, and will
examine the relationship of both of these processes to common-law
decisions. The conclusions that one draws from juxtaposing the Article 9 process with the Restatement process and common-law decisionmaking seem striking: regardless of the proposal and regardless of
whether it was Gilmore's Committee, the current Drafting Committee,
or some future Drafting Committee, the approach we currently use
for developing secured credit policy in Article 9 cannot give serious,
considered attention to the priority question at the core of the institution of secured credit. The problem is largely structural. It does not
depend on the personal views, backgrounds, or expertise of those involved in the reform process' ° or on the quality of empirical or other
research that might be developed on the question.
There are several implications to the analysis. The first is retrospective. If the Article 9 process cannot develop sound, fundamental
policy on the core issue of secured creditor priority, then little significance should be attached to the Article 9 Drafting Committee's rejection of the Warren Proposal. The analysis here would suggest that the
Committee could do little other than reject the Proposal.
The other implications of the analysis are prospective. First, if
the core issue of secured creditor priority cannot be addressed in the
Article 9 process, where should it be addressed? Historically, the an-

Professor Warren did it for them, they made no apparent efforts at, among other things,
constructive criticism, at reworking it to make it more palatable, or at considering alternatives to limit directly priority for secured creditors. This lack of interest in the question,

and the unison of negative reaction on what seems a very controversial and central question in secured credit, beg for an explanation.
9 Professors Schwartz and Scott have examined the "private legislature" in this context. Alan Schwartz & RobertE. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy ofPrivateLegislatures,143 U. PA.
L. REv. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994). See
also Steve H. Nickles, Consider Process Before Substance, Commercial Law Consequences of the
Bankruptcy System: Urging the Merger of the Article 9 DraftingCommittee and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 AM. BAMuta L.J. 589, 595-96 (1995) (discussing the "federal legislative process");
Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of
Revising UCCArticles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 743 (1993).
10 In this respect, the analysis is different from that developed by Professors Schwartz
and Scott. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, and Scott, supra note 9. The analysis would
therefore suggest that the defects are immune to correction by inviting more persons to
participate in the process, however important that may be in its own right.
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swer has been in the bankruptcy law,"1 but such a solution may have
problems of its own.12 Second, does the historic process for develop-

ing secured credit policy-state law expansion followed by bankruptcy
law contraction-make sense any longer? Such a tit-for-tat process
seems itself inefficient and unlikely to generate optimal policy. This
Article's analysis thus may offer additional reasons for reexamining
the process through which we make policy in the field of secured
credit.
The discussion will begin with a brief visit to the common law to
observe another core attribute of secured credit-the judicial hostility
historically accorded to it. Several centuries of case law suggest strong
discomfort in the courts with the distributional consequences of secured credit. The Legal Realist might well conclude that wisdom can
be found in the distributional results of such common-law decisions
regardless of the often strained legal mechanics of reaching the result.
It was partly because he ignored these distributional results that Gil13
more ultimately "repented."
The discussion will then turn to the American Law Institute
("ALI")/National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") process1 4 for developing the UCC and briefly compare it with the ALI process for developing a Restatement of Law. At
their core, both processes commission a group of experts to study the
law and develop a set of rules for the area to be covered. Beyond
obvious differences in sponsoring bodies and the need for state enactment of the UCC, there is a very basic difference in the relationship
between each of these processes and common-law decisions in the
area under review: judicial decisions both limit and anchor the Restatement process; they perform no such necessary functions in the
development of the UCC.
The next section will turn to the comparable system constraints
on the development of the UCC and, specifically, Article 9 of the
UCC. 1 5 Here, the need for state enactment structurally constrains the

11 Professor Nickles has proposed merging the Article 9 effort with the Bankruptcy
Review Commission's efforts to propose changes to the bankruptcy law. See Nickles, supra
note 9.
12 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve-OutApply Only in Bankruptcy? A
Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CornLL L. REv. 1483, 1483-88 (1997).
13
Gilmore, supra note 7, at 615, 627.
14 The ALI and NCCUSL are the sponsoring organizations for the Uniform Commercial Code. For an extensive description of the ALI/NCCUSL process, see Scott, supra note
9, at 1803-10.
15 Although similar dynamics might be observed in other areas covered by the UCC,
secured credit may be unique because distributional issues are central to secured credit in
a way they may not be in other UCC areas. Cf Nickles, supra note 9, at 590 (explaining that
"[b]ankruptcy aims for distributive fairness"). I make no attempt to apply the observations
about the Article 9 process to the broader UCC.
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kinds of proposals the Article 9 process can entertain. As should become clear, any proposal to fundamentally alter the priority status of
the Article 9 secured creditor must be rejected because of very legitimate concerns about "enactability." Even if there were compelling
empirical data or an otherwise strong general consensus that limiting
secured credit was sound policy, it seems that such a policy could not
be implemented through the Article 9 reform process.
But while the need for state enactment constrains the Article 9
process, it does not-and cannot-offer it either direction for reform
or benchmarks for decisions about reforms. What substitutes for the
benchmark function of common-law decisions in the Article 9 process
is the logic of secured credit itself, which produces a work product
that, like common-law decisions and Restatements, purports to be free
of the personal bias and judgment of the participants in the process. I
hope to show that this logic both precludes serious consideration of a
proposal as openly distributional as Professor Warren's and imposes
its own distributional consequences which are likely at odds with the
interests of many unsecured creditors.
I will conclude by suggesting that, in the final analysis, the priority of secured credit is at least as much a question of fair distribution
as it is a matter of efficiency, however one defines it.16 In that respect,
the priority of secured credit shares much with better-known limits on
creditors' rights such as limitations on wage garnishment and statutes
creating debtors' exemptions. While these and other limitations on
what creditors can do in the event of debtor default can be subjected
to an efficiency analysis, efficiency analysis can supply only a partand perhaps a very small part-of the determinants of sound policy.
In many areas of debtor-creditor law such as these, distributional consequences are at least as important as "efficiency" (however defined)
in setting sound policy. If distributional consequences are also inseparable in the setting of sound policy, then the analysis here would
counsel a serious reexamination of the processes through which we
create policy in the area of secured credit.

16 Most of the modem scholarship into the priority of secured credit has approached
it from the perspective of "efficiency" and has, by making or relaxing one or more assumptions, asserted that secured creditor priority is either "efficient" or "inefficient." Although
economic analysis has illuminated previously obscure areas of the subject, the point here is
that, even if we could agree on the correct frame of reference for an efficiency analysis, our
conclusions about the efficiency of secured creditor priority would not define sound policy. Rather, efficiency would be one factor in sound policy-setting and might well be outweighed by conclusions about distributional fairness, a point nearly all economists would
concede. The near-exclusive dominance of economic analysis of the question, however,
might lead one wrongly to conclude otherwise.
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I
THE MEANING OF COMMON-LAw

HosTIr

If the first priority of the secured creditor were not the defining
characteristic of secured credit, judicial animosity towards the institu7
tion would be. This hostility may be unequaled in commercial law.'
Even before the time of Twyne's Case,'8 the English courts of equity
began protecting borrowers' equity of redemption from the mortgagee to whom the borrower had conveyed title.19 Students of secured
transactions routinely begin courses in the subject with Twyne's Case or
comparable cases in which courts openly display their hostility to
primitive attempts at creating security interests.20 Professors Baird
and Jackson begin their casebook treatment of the subject with the
early case of Clow v. Woods. 21 There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
conveniently found that the secured party's failure to particularize the
items of collateral in the security agreement, structured as a sales contract, was "fatal."22 The court said that "[i] n a case of this kind, the
slightest neglect in any circumstance the nature of the case may admit
of as an equivalent for actual possession, is unpardonable." 23 What
the courts then said-that a "fraud" label attaches to one's display of
apparent ownership despite a secret encumbrance-was wholeheartedly embraced by legislatures as they searched for ways to correct the
problem and thereby expand secured lending.
Had policymakers at that time been Legal Realists, they might
have wondered about this unabashed animosity towards security and
whether there were distributional messages to be read in what the
courts were doing. Instead, they listened to what the courts were saying and invented filing systems so that creditors could, in theory, discover the true state of the debtor's holdings. 24 They did this, of
17 Strong hostility of common-law courts to the work of business lawyers is also found
in cases dealing with form contracts. Liewellyn's well-known description of common-law

courts' use of"[c]overt tools" to address the problems of form contracts couldjust as easily
describe the work of common-law courts in the secured credit area. K.N. Llewellyn, Book
Review, 52 HARv. L. Rv. 700, 703 (1939).

76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
See LYNN M. LoPuc~i & ELIzABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYsTEMS APPROACH
27-30 (1995).
20 Twyne's Case was, of course, a fraudulent conveyance case and has strong circumstantial evidence of actual fraud. One can, however, also understand its facts as an attempt
at a primitive, albeit clumsy, secured transaction.
18

19

21
DouLAs G. BAiRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
SEcuRrny INTERESrS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 8-23 (2d ed. 1987) (reprinting and discussing

Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819)).
22 Clow, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 282.
23

Id.

The filing system's ability to cure the "ostensible ownership problem" has been a
theoretical anchor for one view of secured credit. See generally Thomas H. Jackson &
24

Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143

1997]

THE REALIST AND SECURED CREDIT

1517

course, without much thought to limiting the ambit of secured lending. There was probably no need: primitive notions of property
(which included the notion that one could not convey what one did
not own) 25 and the very cumbersome nature of secured lending made
it likely that something would always remain for unsecured creditors
in insolvency. The structure of the law itself "carved-out" assets for
unsecured creditors.
Although courts embraced the legislatively-blessed secured credit
regime at the core, at the periphery, they remained hostile. This hostility manifested itself in the courts' demand that the documentation
be letter perfect 26 -a tendency that extends to this day-and their
resolute findings against secured credit as business lawyers pushed at
the fringes with innovative transaction forms. In the period that preceded the revolution in secured lending that was Article 9, Benedict v.
Ratne72 7 stands out as perhaps the most famous of the cases reacting to
28
business lawyer expansion of secured lending.

Gilmore stated the case many times. Hub Carpet Company assigned its accounts receivable to Ratner on May 23 for an existing loan
plus future advances. 2 9 The arrangement called for Hub to give
Ratner a list of the accounts on the twenty-third day of each month.
Hub was to collect the accounts and could use the money collected as
it saw fit, although the documents gave Ratner the right, among other
things, to collect the assigned accounts even though no default had
occurred.3 0 There were no requirements that Hub replace collected
accounts nor that it account to Ratner.3 1 Hub gave Ratner the last list
on September 23, three days before it was put into involuntary bankruptcy.32 Benedict, the trustee, collected the accounts and Ratner de-

manded them as assignee. 3 Justice Brandeis decided that the
arrangement was fraudulent under New York law and, therefore, that
34
Ratner had no rights to the accounts in bankruptcy.
(1979) (discussing notice filing). Professor LoPucki-challenged the theory conceptually.
LoPucki, supranote 1. The fact that we permit the separation of possession and ownership
in true leases under UCG Article 2A presents a substantial challenge to the ostensible own-

ership
25
26
27

theory as well.
See 1 GRur GiLMoRE, SEcuRrry INTERESrS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY 228-29 (1965).
See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 21, at 35.
268 U.S. 353 (1925).
28
Grant Gilmore seems to have had a fascination with Benedict He devoted an entire
36 page chapter of his treatise to the case and its implications, 1 G LMoRE, supra note 25, at
250-86, and it formed the core of his secured credit discussion when he repented as a
draftsman. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 621-27.

31

See Benedict 268 U.S. at 359.
See id. at 359-60.
See id. at 360.

32

See id.

33
34

See id.
See id,

29
30
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As Gilmore suggested, one must consider Benedictand these other
cases from a realist perspective. 35 The Benedict analysis, as Gilmore has
repeatedly pointed out, was unconvincing. 3 6 Justice Brandeis, a most
gifted Supreme Court Justice and one not likely to miss alternative
ways to resolve a hard case before him, misread New York law.37 As

Gilmore has noted, the decision directly affected this entire area of
financing by forcing a monitoring of the debtor by the secured creditor.38

By requiring the monitoring-a transaction cost-Brandeis

both limited the ambit of secured financing by raising its price, and
likely reduced insolvency problems by putting the secured party more
firmly in charge of the debtor than before. 39 The legal reality of Benedict was distributive and probably "inefficient" in a narrow sense. 40 Its
effects on the dynamic of secured financing were not unlike those that
would be effected by a more direct limitation on secured lending such
as found in the Warren Proposal.
True to the historic call ofjudicial decision and response of legislative countermeasure, Gilmore's Article 9 effort rejected what Brandeis said in Benedict v. Ratner. But true to historic form as well, those
35 Dean Scott describes a tension in the common law between doing "present justice"
and "future justice." Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and theJusticeParadox,35 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 329, 331-34 (1993). His analysis might suggest that courts in the area of secured
credit have been hard on secured creditors because they are faced with individual cases
resulting in unsavory distributional consequences, and that those consequences override
courts' concem for longer-term policy implications of their decisions. We may or may not
disagree. I agree with Dean Scott that courts are directly faced with the distributional
implications of legal rules in individual cases. I believe, however, that if they fall prey to
those implications on a regular basis, their decisions are signaling something about the
rules themselves. Courts doing justice in individual cases is, arguably, the essence of the
common law itself. See generally RICHARD B. CAPPALUI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW
METHOD (1997) (offering "an account of how American judges, working in the common
law tradition, create, interpret and apply precedents as law in the resolution of disputes
before them"); KARL N. LLEwFLLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION: DECIDING APPEALS 23-24
(1960) (discussing courts' "need, duty, and responsibility for bringing out a result which is
just").
36 E.g, Gilmore, supra note 7, at 621-25.
37 See 1 GILMORE, supra note 25, at 257-59; Gilmore, supra note 7, at 622-23.
38 1 GMORE, supra note 25, at 260-61.
39 See id. at 259-61. Although Gilmore did not state it in these terms, the Benedict
decision was also "inefficient" in the way that was understood in the reform process both
then and now. See infra Part III.B.
40
I use "efficiency" here to connote the thrust of the reform process to create reforms that will facilitate and streamline the secured credit system. The economic underpinning is that secured credit with reduced transaction costs is more "efficient" than
secured credit with greater transaction costs. Because such a view excludes the interests of
many who can be affected by secured credit, policy generated through this narrow frame of
reference may yield inefficient results in a larger economic frame of reference. See Bebchuk
& Fried, supra note 1; LoPucki, supra note 1; infra Part III.B; cf William J. Woodward, Jr.,
NewJudgment Liens on PersonalProperty:Does "Efficient"Mean"Better"?, 27 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1
(1990) (assessing the benefits of increased "efficiency" of the judgment-collection system).

1997]

THE REALIST AND SECURED CREDIT

1519

drafters did not capture the policy Brandeis was advancing with his
41
decision: that secured lending required limits.

It is well known that Article 9 was intended to make secured lending simpler, and to do away with technicalities seized on by courts to
dislodge security interests. Most who know the present statute and its
workings have great admiration for its elegance and for what it accomplished. Yet, over forty years of Article 9 have not convinced the
courts of the substantive merits of complete secured creditor priority;
judicial hostility remains.
DollarBank v. Swartz42 is a modem display of this hostility. In Dollar Bank, the debtors gave the lender an Article 9 security interest in
their business assets, personally guaranteed the debt, and backed up
the guarantees with a mortgage on their residence. 43 The lender
agreed to use reasonable efforts to foreclose on its Article 9 security
interest before it moved against the personal assets. 44 Unfortunately,
the lender filed its financing statements under several trade names for
the debtor, none of which was the debtor's real name,45 and, in the
corporation's bankruptcy, abandoned any attempt to get the inventory.46 When the lender attempted to foreclose on the residence, the

debtors asserted that the bank had not used the contractually-required reasonable efforts to reach the inventory and, without doing
so, it could not get the real estate. 4 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
49
agreed.48 It easily could have held for the bank.
Since Gilmore's original creation of Article 9, there have also
been signs of legislative animosity towards full secured creditor prior41
See Gilmore, supranote 7, at 627; cf.1 GiLMoRE, supra note 25, at 358-59 (discussing
limitations).
42
657 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1995).
43
Id. at 1243.
44
See id.
45
Despite Article 9's attempt to give secured lenders leeway, cf U.C.C. § 9-402(8)
cmt. 9 (1995), most lawyers know that courts expect perfection of a security interest to be
nearly "perfect." The DollarBank secured creditor gave up the Article 9 security interest
without a fight: there is nothing in the opinion suggesting that the lender even attempted
to assert that its misfiling should be forgiven under UCC § 9-402(8).
46 See DollarBank, 657 A.2d at 1243.
47 See id.
48
Id. at 1245.
49
The court disagreed with the trial court analysis that it was "unreasonable" for the
bank to abandon its attempt to collect the business assets in the bankruptcy case. Instead,
it reached to the period prior to the bank's collection efforts to find that the bank's failure
to properly file made its efforts to reach the business assets first "unreasonable." Id at
1244.
The bank also raised a causation issue: that it was improper for the trial court to
render a summary judgment on the "reasonableness" issue without considering whether a
proper security interest in the business assets would have fully protected the bank, making
foreclosure on the residence unnecessary. Perhaps predictably, the court said the issue
had not been raised below and, therefore, the bank was barred from subsequently raising
it. Id- at 1244-45.
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ity. State legislatures have increasingly created for constituents new
statutory liens which often disrupt preexisting security interests.
These new statutory liens have become sufficiently widespread that an
American Bar Association Business Law Section Task Force has studied them and made recommendations aimed at reducing their impact
on Article 9 security interests.5 0 The cynic (or public choice theorist)
might see the explosion in statutory liens51 as state legislatures caving
in to special interests; 52 the proliferation of statutory liens also may
point to a developing consensus that secured credit requires limits.
II
THE PROcEss: TiH UCC AND THE RESTATEMENTS

The UCC revision process is vaguely similar to the process for
developing Restatements of Law. In both cases, a distinguished group
is assembled to study the law and, through a Reporter, to propose
formulations of black-letter rules. The proposed rules are brought
before the appropriate bodies 55 for votes, are often amended, and are
ultimately adopted. The Restatement process stops there; the UCC
revision process is followed by promulgation of the revisions to the
state legislatures for enactment. Besides this last obvious difference, a
far more subtle, yet profound, difference lies in how these respective
groups treat the common law.
Conventional wisdom holds that Restatements of Law gather
common-lawjudicial decisions, distill their wisdom, and articulate that
wisdom in a way that will yield more clarity and predictability in the
law. 54 A traditionalist can view Restatement projects as Legal Realism
in action-reformers study the cases to ascertain what courts actually
do and then they reformulate the reasoning to give a better voice to
those actions. 55 While Restatement projects often choose a "better"
rule from conflicting decisions, 5 6 at a fundamental level, the enterprise is anchored in the judicial decisions. It is the direct and neces50 Report of the ABA Business Law Section Uniform Commercial Code Committee
Subcommittee on Relation to Other Law Re: Inclusion of Nonpossessory Statutory Liens
in Article 9, October 1996 (on file with author).
51
The Task Force identified 107 statutory liens in California alone. Id. at 1.

52
The "special interest" theory requires one to assume that the interests of (and lobbyists for) financial institutions can be trumped in state legislatures by opposing interests
(and lobbyists). This is certainly not a self-evident proposition.
53 The Restatement comes only before the ALI; the UCC comes both before the ALI
and the NCCUSL.
54
See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 633-34 (1995).
55 Cf G. Edward White, The American Law Instituteand the Triumph ofModernistJurisprudence, 15 L. & Hisr. REv. 1 (1997) (recognizing the role of human creativity in judicial
decisionmaking).
56
Counting decisions and stating the "better" rule has a long history in the Restatement projects. See Shapo, supra note 54, at 634.
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sary connection to those underlying judicial decisions that gives the
57
Restatement process its legitimacy.
Gilmore's 1981 "confession" hinted at how different the Article 9
process is from that just described. He wrote:
We were all "legal realists" and, as good realists, were committed to the propositions that legal rules have little or no predictive
value and that what the courts do is infinitely more important than
what the courts say. In this instance, however, we paid no attention
to our precepts. The law review literature of the 1920's and 1930's
is bursting at the seams with learned articles and faculty-inspired
student notes deploring the short-sightedness and narrow-mindedness of the courts in failing to appreciate the beauty of what came to
be called the "mercantile approach."5 8
The excessive focus on what the courts were saying may have been
extreme in the original process of developing Article 9 of the UCC.
There were no uniform statutory antecedents to Article 9 and the process of developing it involved perhaps the largest burst of legal creativity in modem commercial law. As Gilmore suggested, common-law
cases that limited secured credit were perceived to be the problem, not
a source to be considered in forging a solution. Yet one senses in the
current reform process a comparable enterprise aimed at overruling
or rendering mootjudicial decisions that have tended to limit secured
credit.5 9 In the Article 9 process, then and now, judicial decisions
clearly do not confine the reformers as they do in the Restatement
process.
III
Limrrs AND REFERENCE POINTS FOR ARTICLE 9 RiFoRM

A.

"Enactability"

Limits do not come to the Article 9 reform process through judicial decisions, but through the need for widespread enactment in
57 See id. at 682. Grant Gilmore created one of the best (if slightly idealized) descriptions of the Restatement process. See generally GRANT GiLMoRE, THE DEATH oF CoNrRAcT

(1974).

58 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 615-16 (footnote omitted).
59 In numerous places in the new draft of Article 9, the Drafting Committee has implicitly rejected judicial decisions that interpret Article 9 in a way that tends to limit secured credit. For example, the expanded definition of "proceeds" in section 9-306 will
redefine the term and thereby eliminate those decisions holding that the current "proceeds" definition does not include rental payments. See, e.g., In re Cleary Bros. Constr. Co.,
30 U.C.C. Rep. 1444 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). U.C.C. § 9-306 (Members Consultative Group
Draft No. 1, Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Consultative Draft U.C.C.]. For other examples,
see Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code DraftingProcess: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9Be
Fairto Consumers?, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 69 (1997).
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state legislatures. 60 The term "enactability" captures the reality that
any revision to the UCC must be quickly enacted by state legislatures,
each of which has its own political reality. Without "uniformity," the
UCC loses its great appeal as a commercial statute. Indeed, without it,
the interstate nature of our commerce would quickly demand a Federal
Commercial Code, something that those within the reform process
61
usually consider undesirable.
Enactability has confined the work product of the UCC revision
process, and usually counsels restraint in moving too far from the perceived status quo. 6 2 Enactability operates as the great leveling agent
in the reform process; the need for enactability means that nothing
too controversial can be included in the UCC or some states will balk
and thereby defeat the uniformity that is so central to the validity of
this unusual legislative process.
60 James J. White makes the point that enactability constrains the UCC process in
embracing consumer protection provisions in James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting. Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 219
(1997). In discussing one aspect of enactment of the original Article 9, Grant Gilmore's
classic understatement leads one to the same conclusion: "The gentlemen [of the ALI and
NCCUSL] were not, in their habits of thought or ways of living, revolutionaries.... The
sponsors were, therefore, much happier when the [Article 9] project was described in
terms of non-abolishment of anything-as introducing at most a slight change in terminol-

ogy." 1 GimoPE, supra note 25, at 298.
61
See Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 Loy. LA. L. REv. 703 (1993); Fred H.
Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law Area, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 861,
869-71 (1995).
The debate about whether the commercial code should be enacted at the federal level
has been an ongoing one. See, e.g., Robert Braucher, FederalEnactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 101-08 (1951); Frank R. Kennedy, Federalism
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Bus. LAw. 1225 (1974); F. Stephen Knippenberg &
William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial
Research Agenda 45 Bus. LAW. 2519, 2522-28 (1990); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to
the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observationson the Past,Present,and Future of
the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1358-60 (1986); William Schnader, The Uniform Commercial
Code-Today and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAW. 229, 231-32 (1966); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Recent
Developments in CommercialLaw-Forward:Federalismor Uniformity of CommercialLaw, 11 RuT.CAM. LJ. 527, 546-52 (1980); E. Hunter TaylorJr., Uniformity of CommercialLawand State-b)State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions,30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 364-66 (1978).
62 See Memorandum from Consumer Issues Subcommittee of Article 9 Drafting Committee to Article 9 Drafting Committee, Advisors, and Observers (May 29, 1996) (on file
with author). The Memorandum reads, in part:
A major goal in the revision process is maintenance of uniformity and quick
acceptance of revised Article 9 and the [ ]final decision regarding the extent of special consumer provisions in Article 9 must take into account
enactability of the statute. At the 1995 annual meeting, both in the consideration of Article 2 and of Article 9, many commissioners expressed.., the
opinion that additional consumer related provisions would be important to
enactability in their states. Therefore the Subcommittee is aware of the
need for a balanced approach: the Drafting Committee should not summarily reject proposals for additional consumer provisions, but at the same
time it should exercise caution in proposing such provisions.
Id. at 3.
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This need for enactability is a fundamental 63 and structural limitation. It follows from the fact that the UCC is state legislation that
the Code requires uniformity, and that we have no way of getting all
our jurisdictions to enact it at once. Enactability explains why Warren's Proposal received a one-sided reaction within the reform process. The need for enactability prompts one to predict that no
proposal to alter the first priority of the secured creditor would have a
realistic chance of success in any ALI/NCCUSL process, irrespective
of the soundness of empirical or other policy support.
Consider the prospect of including in a new proposed Article 9
the Warren Proposal or any other proposal materially altering the first
priority of the secured creditor. 64 What state would be the first to
enact it? Even if financial institutions had only average influence in
state legislatures, state politicians would become fearful that, with the
Proposal in place, financing would be driven out of state or that new
businesses would migrate to states that permitted secured financing
on 100% of a debtor's personal property under the old Article 9.
There is no process-nor is one ever likely to be developed-that obtains simultaneous state enactments of the UCC. 65 The result of this
63 Professor Rubin has implied that the need for enactability worked its way into the
very conception of the UCO Articles 3 and 4 project by confining its scope. Rubin, supra
note 9, at 746.
64 The dynamic hypothesized in the text would hold for any proposal to alter the
secured creditor's first priority, including a "restatement-type" proposal (as yet to be developed) that might permit a court to avoid a security interest in whole or in part because of a
predatory or negligent extension of credit, the inability of the competing claimant to protect himself, among other things, "when justice required." An example of this kind of
provision is, of course, UCG § 2-302, permitting a court to avoid a contract or term on the
basis of"unconscionability." U.C.G. § 2-302 (1995). Less obvious, perhaps, is UCC § 2-209,
which did away with the "preexisting duty rule" in sales contracts but invited courts to
address predatory contract modifications through the rubric of "good faith." See U.C.C.
§ 2-209 cmt. 1, 2 (1995).
65 While extremely unlikely, states could develop a process for simultaneous enactment. If they were to do so, they could protect themselves from the perceived competitive
disadvantage of being the first to embrace an idea like the carve-out proposal.
One method of simultaneous enactment was developed during the Great Depression.
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,301 U.S. 548 (1937), Justice Cardozo describes the reservations some states had in enacting state unemployment compensation statutes. "Many
[states] held back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they
would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors." Id. at 588. Massachusetts solved this problem by providing that its
state legislation would not go into effect unless either the pending federal law were passed
or eleven of twenty-one named states were to enact laws with burdens on their employers
that were "substantially equivalent." Id. at 588 n.9. If such a mechanism were developed
for UCC enactment, it would substantially reduce the constraints on policymaking imposed
by the current need for uniform enactment.
Whether such a mechanism could be adapted to a uniform state statute governing
commercial law is beyond the scope of this Article. While the question is worth pursuing,
it is not even clear at this point that the development of such a mechanism would be a
good thing. The Article 9 process lacks the political constraints of the federal legislative
process and the systemic constraints of the Restatement process. For all its faults in con-
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variation of the collective action problem is that no state would be the
first to enact Article 9 with the Proposal and, therefore, a new Code
66
with the Proposal would be dead on arrival.
The constraint of enactability is, however, fundamentally different from the constraint of common-law decisions on the Restatement
process. The common-law limits on the Restatement process come
from accumulated judicial decisions made in real cases over, perhaps,
a long time. By contrast, the constraint of enactability is the collective
perception of a relatively small number of people about what will be
acceptable to a diverse group of state legislatures. Thus, unlike the
case with Restatements, enactability exposes the UCC reform process
67
to outside political pressure.
Moreover, the political pressure that an interested entity or
group might apply in the UCC reform process is probably leveraged
pressure. This is because the threat of blocking a revision's enactment in even a few key states could effect a drafting change that the
interest group might not be powerful enough to obtain at the Congressional level. 68 The effect of the need for enactability is to elimi-

nate as not viable any provisions that might offend an organized
group of participants.
That the end product of the revision process is targeted at state
legislatures means that, in some sense, the drafters are performing
legislative work. 69 Because the drafters or advisers must respond to
straining the development of sound policy, the current limitations of enactability also constrain the influence any interest group can have on the development of the law. We may
well be better off with enactability as a constraint on policymaking discretion than with no
constraint at all.
66
If the drafters included a carve-out provision but permitted states to "opt out" of
the provision or if states thought they could do so on their own, the result would be that no
state would enact the Proposal first.
67
Some might argue that the development of a Restatement never has been and
never can be apolitical and that politics has played an increasing role in the Restatement
process in recent years. See, e.g., Shapo, supranote 54, at 645-46. Even if that were true, the
political nature of the two processes is fundamentally different because of the necessity of
state enactment for the UCC.
68
If, for example, a group did not like the final product, they might block passage in
a large state like California or New York and thereby effect change to the entire uniform
statute.
Professor Rubin describes the efforts of individuals in several states who succeeded in
blocking the enactment of Articles 3 and 4. Rubin, supra note 9, at 784. Had such persons
been active in the drafting process then (as some of them are now), their threat of blocking enactment would have given them great leverage to effect a change in the draft. Cf.
White, supra note 60, at 222 (describing bankers' opposition to Articles 3, 4, and 8 and
their effect on the drafting process).
69 Reliance on the state legislative processes for "political" checks is misplaced because the UCC comes to state legislatures as a package that carries the prestige of the
sponsoring organizations and, perhaps, the implication that difficult policy choices have
been resolved in a "neutral" fashion. Professor Rubin's experience in connection with the
California legislature was that the legislature did not know what Articles 3 and 4 meant but
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the pressures of effecting widespread state enactment, they are subject
70
to political pressure not unlike that applied to elected legislators.
But since the reformers are neither elected officials nor philosophers
or moralists, the constraints imposed by enactability and their insight
into it do not anchor their work product in the same way that common-law decisions anchor the work product in the Restatement
process.
B.

"Efficient" Secured Credit

In the case of Article 9, an internal logic of the institution of secured credit itself which is driven, perhaps, by the expertise of those
in the process, 7 1 tends to anchor and steer decisions in much the
same way that common-law decisions do in the Restatement process.
The dominant enterprise is to make the system of secured credit as
sleek and usable as the reformers can make it.7 2 When articulated in
"neutral" property terms, the idea is that "[t] he law should not impair
assumed that policy choices had been well-resolved by the prestigious sponsoring organizations. Rubin, supra note 9 at 782. Cf Scott, supranote 9, at 1814-16 (asserting that members tend to accept the judgment of the sponsoring organization if clear and unopposed,
but generally favor the status quo because of information asymmetries and the costs of
overcoming ignorance).
70 To their substantial credit, those directly involved in the reform process made great
strides in publicizing and exposing the UCC revision process to all interested parties. The
reforms to the process have followed a barrage of criticism that it had effectively excluded
those with consumer perspective. See generallyMark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U C. C. Artides Three and Four A Process Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires FederalAction, 43
MERCER L. Rxv. 827 (1992) (criticizing the drafters of the 1990 revisions to Articles 3 and 4
for excluding consumer interests in the law of payment systems); Corinne Cooper, The
MadonnasPlay Tug of War with the Whores or Who Is Saving the UCC, 26 Loy. LA. L. REv. 563
(1993) (describing the battle between interest-group representatives and "law reform
junkies" in the UCC drafting process); Gall Hillebrand, The Redrafling of UCC Articles 2 and
9: Model Codes orModel Dinosaurs?, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 191 (1994) (discussing the deficiencies in Articles 2 and 9 as they relate to consumers primarily due to the UCC's basis as a
commercial code); Donald B. King, MajorProblems With Article 2A: Unfairness, "Cutting Off"
ConsumerDefenses, Unfiled Interests, and Uneven Adoption, 43 MERCER L. R~v. 869 (1992) (explaining numerous problems with Article 2A); Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM. & MA~Uy L. REv. 1565 (1994) (discussing possible revisions to
Article 2 necessitated by growth of the consumer movement); Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the UCC Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L.REv. 1593
(1994) (arguing that the revised Article 2 needs to address the unique characteristics and
needs of consumer and commercial transactions).
Although these efforts have exposed the Drafting Committee to various kinds of political pressure described in the text, they have substantially opened the process and will
probably improve the end result. If,
however, I am correct that the problem in the Article
9 process is structural, then no amount of process or representation will correct it.
71 Dean Scott has argued that the controlling expertise is that of those in the financing industry and that such expertise tends to bias the results. Scott, supra note 9, at 18b607, 1850-51.
72 See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-BasedTheory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2021-22 (1994) (reviewing
evolution of treatment of security interests).
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the ability of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts with
as much or as little of their existing and future property as they deem
appropriate." 73 Such goals can produce a work product that seems
free of the personal biases or values of those who created it.74 Ironically, this makes the language of Article 9 reform resemble the "neutral" language of judicial opinions rather than the often openly
distributional language of legislatures.
Common-law courts do not often openly exercise their discretion
in deciding commercial law cases. 75 The common law in the area of
secured credit does not contain cases voiding security interests because, under the circumstances, to enforce the security interests
would be "unfair" to unsecured claimants or to the debtor. 76 Similarly, outside Article 9, common-law courts do not commonly decide
how much wage garnishment ought to be permissible 7 7 or how much
property a debtor can keep from ajudgment creditor. 78 More generally, common-law courts usually do not directly decide questions of distributional fairness; rather courts explain decisions that have
distributional consequences by referring to neutral precedent and
rules which "compelled" the decision at hand. 79 Common-law courts
appeal to rules of law and precedent in order to anchor their decisions in "law" and distance them from the personal biases and discretion of the judge.
This form of "efficiency" tends to exclude the impact of secured credit policy decisions on "outsiders" to the secured credit transactions whether they be tort creditors or
other kinds of unsecured creditors.
73 Id. (footnote omitted). As to "future property," compare the older common-law
wisdom that one could not convey what one did not "own." See supra text accompanying
note 25.
74
Dean Scott says that "[b]oth the ALI and the NCCUSL believe that their function is
to deal with technical problems that can be resolved by legal expertise and to avoid issues
whose resolution requires controversial value choices." Scott, supra note 9, at 1805-06.
75 Cf Llewellyn, supra note 17, at 702-03 (commenting on the reluctance of American
courts to look closely at standard form contracts). While the UCC, particularly Llewellyn's
Article 2 with its flexible concepts of good faith and unconscionability, has invited a greater
use ofjudicial discretion, the situation has not changed much since Llewellyn's day. The

major exception may lie in bankruptcy court decisions under the Bankruptcy Code.
76 As examples, see the discussion of Clow v. Woods, Benedict v. Ratner, and DollarBank
v. Schwarz, supra text accompanying notes 21-49.
77
Cf Consumers Credit Protection Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994) (stating the
disadvantages of unrestricted garnishment and the need for Congressional regulation). In
bankruptcy, however, they do decide how much of a debtor's total income constitutes "disposable income" and thus how much must be devoted to a Chapter 13 Plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1325(b) (1) (B), 1325(b) (2) (1994).
78
Cf 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (specifying property exempt during bankruptcy proceedings). Courts do decide, for example, "[ius a bus a bus, or is it a car?" In reJohnson, 14 B.R.
14, 14 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981), but do not directly decide whether motor vehicles ought to
be exempted. It is rare to find overt policymaking at the trial court level.
79
Cf Llewellyn, supra note 17, at 702-03 (discussing several "semi-covert" techniques
that courts use to balance bargains).
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Like common-law judges, reformers in the Article 9 process require "neutral" principles on which to ground their judgments; they
cannot directly articulate a policy decision by reference to distributional fairness. Like common-law courts, it is hazardous for Article 9
reformers to confront a distributional issue directly, much less to legislate a distributional consequence directly. Their process is, indeed,
limited by logic and must be short on direct confrontations with values. This, of course, limits their work product to neutral-sounding
provisions. 80
A great many of the proposed changes, indeed, sound "neutral"
and "logical." Two of the best examples are proposals to permit the
phrase "all assets" to describe collateral in the security agreement and
financing statement 81 and the proposed expansion of the definition
of proceeds. 82 In both instances, some courts have strictly construed
the current statute and avoided security interests for inadequate descriptions8 3 or because what was claimed did not fit the definition of
proceeds. 8 4 If the "true intent" in a secured lending transaction were
to give a security interest in all the debtor had or will have, why would
85
Article 9 simply not permit that without requiring more specificity?
80 A different view of the revision process sees it as far more political. See generally
Rubin, supra note 9 (describing how private attorneys' biases influence the revision process); Scott, supranote 9 (discussing the "politics" of Article 9). This is sometimes manifest
in the consumer area where consumers have been said by some to be "taking over" and
forcing their views into the drafts. See Norman I. Silber, Substance Abuse at UCC Drafting
Sessions, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 225 (1997). At times, the result is a political compromise of the
negative sort: we will block enactment if X provision is included in the revision. Again,
this dynamic tends to limit the statute to provisions that do not disturb the distributional
preferences of any organized group. See Scott, supra note 9, at 1816-22.
81 The proposal to permit "all assets" to suffice as a description of the collateral in the
security agreement was a part of revised Article 9 (proposed § 9-111) but was eventually
rejected by the Drafting Committee in November 1996. U.C.C. § 9-111, n.1 (Discussion
Draft No. 2, Apr. 17, 1997). The logic of the "all assets" description is captured in an
earlier comment to the draft, now deleted:
Some have questioned whether "all assets" or "all personal property" suffice
as a description for purposes of a security agreement. (Whether or not it
should, arguably it does, inasmuch as it reasonably identifies the collateral).
Consultative Draft U.C.C. § 9-111 (emphasis added). The idea that "all assets" or "all personal property" is sufficient as a description remains within the proposed revision to the
provision dealing with financing statements. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (Discussion Draft No. 2,
Apr. 17, 1997).
82 See Consultative Draft U.C.C. § 9-313.
83 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Staggs, 453 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ill. App. Ct 1983);
Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Glenn's Marine, Inc., 579 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Ark. 1979).
84 See, e.g., In re Cleary Bros. Constr. Co., 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1444, 1445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1980).
85 A common answer has been that "all assets" would make it "too easy" to take a
security interest. Indeed, it is common to understand judicial hostility to security interests
as a statement that a secured creditor has to "earn" its security interest. Like its "logical"
opposite, this too is a distributional statement.
To suggest that a secured creditor has to "earn" its collateral is to say that the secured
creditor must work (in the form of increased transaction costs) to get its security interest.
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Future creditors, finding the financing statement or security agreement, could not be deceived any more than at present and there
would be transaction cost savings in reduced paperwork. What possibly could be wrong with such reforms? 8 6 Proposed changes like these
will, no doubt, expand secured lending by, at worst, making it easier
to accomplish. 87 If improvement of the secured credit system, taken in
isolation, is the goal, such proposals improve the system. Case law to
the contrary is not to be reconciled; it is to be rejected.
But an "efficient" Article 9, one that reduces the transaction costs
of secured lending by improving the operation of the current statute
and expanding its ambit, is anything but neutral in its distributional
effects.8 8 As with the long-and probably unending-lines of hostile
judicial decisions in this area, distributional policy is being set in the
revisions to Article 9 just as it was being set in the original enactment
under cover of a veneer of efficiency. Those in the reform process
tend to define efficiency as efficiency within the system of secured
credit and, by so defining it, they tend to exclude any real focus on
secured credit's externalities. Questions such as whether expansion
of secured credit will contract other kinds of lending or impose costs
on those in no position to avoid them largely go unasked and unanswered. In short, the predominantly narrow emphasis on "improving
secured credit" within the reform process both makes distributional
policy without acknowledging it and precludes consideration of
whether secured credit itselfmight be inefficient-the precise focus of
recent scholarship in this Symposium and elsewhere on the priority of
secured debt.
At first blush, it seems obvious that a group of experts charged
with developing comprehensive legislation about credit secured by
personal property ought to be considering the basic priority question
Consider substituting a tax for the transaction costs the secured creditor now must pay. To
whom would the revenues go?
The value of security interests, avoided because the secured creditor did not "work
hard enough," goes to unsecured creditors. Proponents of the "work harder" position
would, no doubt, also assert that the substituted tax revenue ought to go to the unsecured
creditors whose interests are displaced by the secured creditor. The Warren Proposal can
be understood as a variation of this idea.
86 Other proposed reforms simply expand the kinds of collateral that will be subject
to Article 9. As currently proposed, the new statute will permit the creation of security
interests in some deposit accounts, see Consultative Draft U.C.C. §§ 9-113(13), 9-113(14), 9304, and some kinds of tort claims, see Consultative Draft U.C.C. § 9-112. On another
front, an American Bar Association Task Force is attempting to have the Lanham, Patent,
and Copyright Acts revised to make it clear that Article 9 will cover federal intellectual
property. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where IntellectualProperty and Commercial

Law Collide, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 1645, 1725-29 (1996).
87 It is debatable whether more financing will actually become available or whether
these reforms will simply expand collateral at the margins.
88 For development of this same point at greater length in connection with state statutes for execution on judgments, see Woodward, supra note 40.
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at the core of the subject matter. State legislatures will probably assume they did.8 9 The Warren Proposal, in effect, simply asked those
in the process to actually confront the priority issue directly.
But when one considers the constraints on those within the ALI/
NCCUSL process, it is apparent why they could not face the priority
issue.90 How would a neutral body developing neutral principles possibly evaluate or advance such an openly distributional proposal?
How could a process, whose mission is "improved efficiency" of secured credit, accommodate a proposal that seemed not to expand but
to contract secured lending and, by imposing monitoring costs that
were not required before, make secured lending more-not lesscumbersome? How could a group of unelected private individuals resolve a core distributional question about the appropriate division of
assets among secured and unsecured claimants? The questions the
Warren Proposal raised are just too big, too direct, and too political
for the revision process to handle.
CONCLUSION:

WHERE

Do

WE

Go

FROM HERE?

If the core policy question of secured creditor priority will receive
a hearing at all, it will have to be at the federal level. 9 1 And although
conclusions of one sort or another about the efficiency of secured
credit (broadly conceived) will no doubt be important, efficiency is
only part of what should be involved in setting policy. The priority of
secured credit is as much a question of distributional fairness as it is a
question of efficiency. In insolvency situations, expanded secured
creditor priority (or more "efficient" secured lending) takes assets
that would otherwise go to unsecured creditors and gives them to secured creditors. Moreover, as Dean Baird has pointed out,92 this re-

distribution may be very regressive: it may well take from injured tort
creditors, employees, and divorced spouses (among others) 93 and give
to financial institutions. Even if we were convinced that it were effi89 See Rubin, supra note 9, at 782-85.
90 The political predispositions or backgrounds of those involved in the reform process are not central to the argument. The constraints on the process in this context would
suggest that any group, whether composed of bankers or bankruptcy trustees, would be
most reluctant to advance a proposal to openly alter the priority now given to secured
creditors.
91 The constraints I described above under the concept of "enactability," see supraPart
III.A, will constrain states in independently deciding that there should be direct limits on
secured creditor priority. It will not prevent individual states, however, from eroding the
security interest through further proliferation of statutory liens, a piecemeal and non-uniform cure to all-encompassing security interests that may be worse than the disease.
92 See Douglas G. Baird, The Importance of Priority, 82 CoRNELL L. REV. 1420, 1426-29
(1997).
93 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (listing priority claimants paid in bankruptcy after secured creditors are fully paid).

1530

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1511

cient (in the broad sense) to do that, we might decide that the distributional implications of such a decision are simply undesirable. If
one were convinced that the distributional consequences were undesirable under present or expanded secured credit, one might address
those consequences even in the absence of firm, empirical evidence
94
on the efficiency question.
We have made similar distributional determinations by outlawing
imprisonment for debt, creating the personal bankruptcy discharge, 95
limiting wage garnishment, 96 and limiting broad non-purchase money
security interests in consumer goods. 97 One can argue that any of
these limitations is "inefficient." Each seems to drive up the cost of
credit and benefit the very few who default on their obligations at the
expense of the many who do what they promise. Each, arguably,
keeps credit from honorable, but marginal, borrowers. But efficiency
arguments have not prevailed: rather, in all these cases, policy decisions seem driven by distributional and fairness considerations. Indeed, history suggests that debtor-creditor law is largely about
distributional fairness, first to debtors who promise but cannot deliver
and, more recently, to outsiders to the secured credit transaction who,
98
for one reason or another, do not take protective action.
The analysis here has argued that the Article 9 reform process
cannot (and probably should not) confront distributional fairness issues, yet, by setting secured credit policy, the process is making distributional decisions. Can sound policy in the area of secured credit be
made without resolving the distributional implications of making secured credit "better"? Historically, we have muddled through with a
tit of secured credit reform followed by a tat of bankruptcy reform.
94
Cf Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Sodal Costs and Benefits
and Identifying the Victims of SubordinatingSecurity Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 COpNELL L. RE..
1349, 1349 (1997) (recommending "approaches for quantifying the major social costs and

benefits likely to result from adoption of a subordination proposal").
95 We have had the modem bankruptcy discharge in voluntary bankruptcy since the
1898 Act. Its most recent incarnation in Chapter 7 is 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994).
96
See Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994).
97
See Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a) (4)
(1997).
The Article 9 process has been decidedly "cool" about including within Article 9 a
provision which would exempt from secured financing under Article 9 that which a debtor
could otherwise exempt from execution under a state's exemption laws. This is despite the
fact that both the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (3) (1994), and federal regulations,
contain such restrictions on secured lending, and despite the fact that Article 9 is (arguably) the better place to include them.
98
In business cases, the effects of insolvency are felt by a broader group than the
debtor's "creditors," and an account of the distributional consequences of insolvency is
incomplete without considering them. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlargingthe BargainingTable: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for FederalBankruptcy Proceedings, 23
CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 468-71 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHi. L. REv.
775, 785-89 (1987).
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But bankruptcy legislation may be problematic in this context, 99 and it
offers little help to tort and other judgment creditors of a fully secured debtor outside of bankruptcy. Moreover, expansion of secured
credit through the ALI/NCCUSL process, followed by its contraction
through bankruptcy legislation, is, at best, 10 0 an extraordinarily inefficient way to make sound policy.
Congress, of course, provides no panacea and inspires little confidence that distributional questions in the area of secured credit will
be addressed head-on in a way likely to produce policy results based
on our cultural values. But whatever the prospects in Congress for a
debate on the policy merits of broad, secured creditor priority, it
seems clear that the distributional questions endemic to secured
credit cannot be resolved in an ALI/NCCUSL process.
As a repentant draftsman, Grant Gilmore looked back and regretted that his process for developing the original Article 9 did not embrace what many of the common-law courts had been doingin the area
of secured credit. 1 1 Inevitably, it is no different now than it was in
Grant Gilmore's day and it will be no different in an ALI/NCCUSL
process in the future. Gilmore did not need to repent; there was
nothing he could have done about it.

99 See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1486. In addition, financial institutions no doubt
would argue before Congress that sound policy (including distributional policy) was already set by national experts in the Article 9 process and it would be wasteful to revisit the
issues.
100 If resolving distributional issues is central to-and inseparable from-the setting of
secured credit policy, then our current two-step process will be neither efficient nor will it
generate optimal policy results.
101 See supra text accompanying note 7.

